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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
SCOTTISH EXPRESS COACH SERVICES -
LOSS LEADERS AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE 
PRACTICE 
by Colin Sinclair, Dept. of Economics, Glasgow 
Caledonian University 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 16 years, the Scottish express coach 
industry has undergone dramatic changes. 
Legislation almost completely reversed the effects of 
the 1930 Road Traffic Act and removed quantitative 
controls in the industry. Express coach services 
were deregulated in 1980 and then privatised in 
1985-86. 
This short paper examines structure, conduct and 
performance in the industry and draws conclusions 
about the nature of competition and the success of 
privatisation and deregulation. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
After deregulation and privatisation, what had been a 
state owned monopoly became 9 distinct regional 
operators, an express service operator and 2 
maintenance/coachbuilding companies. The express 
service operator, Scottish Citylink Coaches, was 
already facing a large amount of competition, both 
cross-border (with Stagecoach Caledonian Express 
and National Express) and on a number of intra-
Scottish routes (especially on routes in Highland 
region). This has all changed with the subsequent 
consolidation of regional operators and mergers 
between express operators. 
The structure of the industry is now, for practical 
purposes, a duopoly. Two operators provide almost 
all express coach network services in Scotland, 
National Express through it's "Scottish partner" 
Scottish Citylink and Stagecoach through ifs 
regional operations Fife Scottish, Western Scottish 
and Northern Bluebird. Of the two, Scottish Citylink 
provides almost twice as many services in terms of 
vehicle mileage. Cross-border services to English 
towns and cities are operated solely by National 
Express. Neither of the operators are competing 
against each other on the same routes, indeed 
Stagecoach Western Scottish occasionally provide 
coaches for duplicate services to Scottish Citylink. 
The method of operation for services in the industry 
is of interest. Scottish Citylink do not own, garage 
or maintain any of the coaches used on their routes. 
Instead they contract independent coach operators to 
run the services on their (Citylink's) behalf. In 1993 
at the time of their merger with National Express 
Citylink had contracts with 14 operators. All of 
these were retained but recent additions to the 
network may have increased this number. These 
contracts are for specific and detailed schedules of 
services and are for a fixed price no matter how 
many passengers are carried. Most contracts are also 
short-term lasting for six months at a time, but 
occasionally longer contracts are awarded to cover 
the provision of new vehicles. The contracts 
generally ensure that vehicles operate in Citylink 
livery and that the operator is responsible for all 
running costs, including drivers, insurance, fuel and 
maintenance. 
It is believed that Stagecoach use similar methods of 
operating, using ifs own regional operators as 
Citylink uses independent operators. This is difficult 
to confirm as internal accounting procedures are not 
available, although since all the express services 
operated by Stagecoach use the Stagecoach Express 
livery rather than regional operators livery it is 
possible that Stagecoach now does treats express 
coach services as a separate business. 
BARRDIRS TO ENTRY 
Barriers to entry have a powerful effect on the 
structure and conduct of the operators in both the 
express coach industry and the wider bus service 
industry. On examination they fall into two broad 
categories exogenous, or externalised, barriers and 
endogenous, or internalised, barriers. 
The principal external barriers are capital 
requirements, economies of scale, differentiation, 
integration and absolute cost advantages. In the 
express coach industry these are of relatively little 
consequence when compared with the levels of such 
barriers in other industries. In the coach industry, 
almost all of the exogenous factors can be offset by 
leasing or operating second hand fleets and garaging 
facilities and the question of absolute cost advantage, 
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certainly in terms of factors of production, is 
practically non-existent. 
Internal barriers, on the other hand, are much higher 
and hence more limiting for potential competitors. 
Retaliation, pre-emptive responses, consumer loyalty 
(or at least consumer familiarity) and the superior 
knowledge of incumbent operators are all typical. 
Combined these endogenous factors make success in 
the industry difficult for potential entrants in general 
and impossible in specific cases where current 
operators act to exclude new operators. 
THE MARKET FOR SERVICES 
The market for long distance transport is dominated 
by the car. Challenging this domination is difficult 
and in the light of Department of Transport statistics 
practically insurmountable (80% of all passenger 
journeys over 50 miles are by "private light 
vehicle"). Of the remaining sources of long distance 
travel, rail is by far the most important alternative 
with just over 10% of the market compared with 
coach services at 3.6%. The balance is by ferry and 
air with air travel significantly poorer than coach for 
the in the market for long distance journeys. 
The bulk of coach patronage is passengers in the 
lower socio-economic groups (42% CI and 35% 
C2DE according to independent research carried out 
for National Express). Assuming that price is a 
primary factor in determining both the decision to 
travel and the choice of mode and that in general 
coach journeys are cheaper than equivalent rail 
journeys, we can say with a degree of certainty that 
typical coach users are impecunious or infrequent 
users without access to a car, for example students, 
backpackers or senior citizens. 
CONDUCT IN THE INDUSTRY 
Conduct in the industry is certainly oligopolistic, and 
in some specific cases on certain routes 
monopolistic. The large operators (specifically 
Scottish Citylink) "co-opt" smaller operators (like 
Skye-Ways and West Coast Motors) into their 
network through leasing agreements and strategic 
partnerships. The Stagecoach approach, in contrast, 
is to buy the smaller operator outright and compete 
away any other incumbents. The large operators 
themselves appear to collude over which services to 
operate (for example, when Western Scottish was 
bought by Stagecoach, Citylink which operated it's 
Ayrshire services using Western Scottish buses 
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pulled out of competition with the new Stagecoach 
services)1. 
Although aspects of competitive behaviour are 
oligopolistic or monopolistic, pricing policies on 
express services are still competitive. The reason for 
this is, of course, that while the industry could be 
seen as a collusive duopoly, the market in which the 
industry operates is actually competitive. 
Railway competition is perceived by the coach 
operators to be their principal source of commercial 
competition. Evidence of this is clear in the 
reactions of express coach operators to changes in 
rail services. Generally speaking, where rail services 
on a route similar to an express coach service are 
frequent the frequency of the coach service is high. 
For example, the introduction of the half hourly 
"Shuttle" service from Glasgow to Edinburgh 
prompted Scottish Citylink to double it's Glasgow -
Edinburgh service frequency to four per hour. Other 
high frequency coach routes are self evidently routes 
in competition with the principal Scotrail/Intercity 
services, for example the Inverness and Aberdeen 
services. 
In addition to the close correlation between service 
frequencies in both long distance coach and rail 
travel additional evidence of the perceived 
competition between rail and coach is seen in the 
pricing of services. Research already carried out 
(Sinclair 1996) shows that, for services with rail 
competition of an appreciable level, price per mile is 
significantly smaller than on those routes with litde 
or no rail competition. 
PERFORMANCE 
In order to establish the way in which the companies 
behave, details of the performance on each of the 
routes was required. Detailed accounts of the 
performance of the bus operators by route are 
generally not available, so primary data collection 
was necessary. 
To ascertain demand by route, on-bus counts were 
taken over a number of days in both summer and 
winter and at a variety of locations throughout 
Scotland. Although the passenger numbers showed 
substantial variation by day and season, it is believed 
that the sample size (600 observations) was 
1
 It has since been revealed that Stagecoach in fact 
paid a "consideration" to Scottish Citylink to 
deregister die services. 
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sufficiently large to give a reasonable estimate of the 
mean passenger numbers by route. 
The approach to estimating the operating revenues 
for routes is similar to the approach taken by 
McGeehan (1984). For each node to node section a 
mean fare has been estimated. The basis for the 
average varies on different nodes. For most nodes 
with relatively short distances between them an 
average of all fares at all stages along the route has 
been taken (principally because of relatively high 
levels of commuting). In the case of node to node 
sections with a greater distance (over 90 or 100 
miles) the fares have been weighted with around 
55% being direct node to node fares and the 
remaining 45% being shared equally between all the 
other fares. By multiplying the resultant mean fare 
by the estimated passenger journeys established from 
the loading surveys, a reasonable estimate of 
operating revenue on the node to node sections can 
be estimated. When the node to node sections are 
summed then a reliable estimate of the route 
revenues is obtained. These revenue estimates were 
then reduced by between 25 and 33% to reflect the 
numbers travelling at a reduced fare (returns, student 
cards, child fares etc.) 
Costs were estimated by a considerably simpler 
method than the one described above for revenues. 
Costs were identified for services in general 
(principally variable and semi-variable costs such as 
labour, fuel, insurance and licenses) and then 
estimated based on available industry figures. Then 
by closely examining past financial figures the 
magnitude of fixed costs (such as administration, 
management, promotion and property maintenance) 
was established. The operating costs were then 
apportioned on the basis of vehicles per route and 
the fixed costs on a mileage basis (the accepted 
CIPFA practice when peak usage cannot be 
established). 
Throughout the analysis of revenues and cost it is 
assumed that the contracts with private hire coach 
companies under which route services are operated 
are reasonable and fair. As a consequence it is also 
assumed that Citylink does in fact shoulder die 
burden of losses on those routes where losses are in 
fact made. 
The combined revenue and cost pattems are shown 
in Table 2. 
The most interesting points brought up by these 
figures are the difference between operating (before 
apportioned overhead) and route (after apportioned 
overhead) profits and the large number of routes 
which run at an overall loss. 
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A major factor in the difference between the 
operating and route profit figures is the method used 
to calculate the apportionment. The mileage basis 
considerably favours shorter less frequent journeys 
(more common in staged services than on express 
routes) and thus makes these seem more profitable. 
Nevertheless, even with this deficiency in the 
apportionment of costs the results are still reasonable 
estimates given that otiier methods of apportionment 
give similar results. Essentially, die loss making 
routes are always the same regardless of the method 
used to estimate the apportioned cost. This result 
men begs the question why are so many routes run at 
a loss? 
Theory suggests a number of reasons why this could 
happen. 
Firstly, the loss making services may be run to 
discourage competition. Citylink may see loss 
leaders as necessary to stop other firms from 
establishing themselves in the express coach service 
market. This would maintain market share and 
protect already tight profit margins. On the selected 
routes which have been or may become attractive to 
new entrants, Citylink will be engaged in a limit 
pricing strategy to discourage competition while still 
maintaining market share and overall profitability. 
Comparing the fares of selected coach services and 
comparable rail services gives a difference in ticket 
price which appears to be more than just competition 
with the rail operator. For example the Glasgow to 
Edinburgh fares (return) are £5 and £8 for bus and 
rail respectively, for a journey which differs in time 
by only ten minutes. Inverness to Thurso shows a 
similar disparity, where for £13.50 by bus and 
£19.50 by train, you can save not only the money 
but 30 minutes of time travelling by bus. Even 
allowing for the difference in "quality" between 
services, this suggests that Citylink depresses it's 
prices below what the market will bear, and so 
supports the suggestion that limit pricing is a 
deliberate policy on certain coach routes. 
Another reason is that Citylink could also be running 
tiiese services to provide a contribution to die asset 
costs and fixed overheads. Although capital ouday 
can be offset, Citylink has a policy of new, 
comfortable buses on it's services and so may incur 
higher fixed costs dian other less stringent operators. 
In order to overcome this, Citylink may run services 
to spread the costs as "thinly" as possible (£500,000 
over 10 routes is a better situation than £500,000 
over 4 routes). 
Finally, Citylink's objectives are unlikely to be profit 
maximisation in the short run. Revenue or 
passenger-journey maximisation is a possible 
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objective given the evidence but a more likely 
objective is that of maximising the "competitive 
appearance" of coach services in comparison with 
railways. This means, essentially, that Citylink is 
attempting to maintain a comprehensive Scottish 
express coach service with regular, reliable services 
in order to provide a viable alternative to the Scotrail 
network, with a long run opportunity of eventual 
monopoly. 
This last point raises interesting questions about the 
comparisons between express coach and rail 
services. The Scottish "inter-city" rail network and 
Citylink's coach network are remarkably similar. In 
fact only Fort William - Skye, Inverness to Ullapool 
and the Kintyre peninsula have no significant rail 
competition; elsewhere train services run parallel to 
coach services (almost literally in some places). In 
addition, as pointed out above price per mile 
between coach and rail services is closely correlated, 
though typically the coach fare is considerably lower 
than the rail figure. This is not surprising on either 
account, correlation can be expected to be high 
between competitors and rail services cost 
considerably more to run (infrastructure and fuel 
costs are significantly higher) and so higher fares 
must be charged to ensure operating profit margins 
are at least similar to the coach operators margins. 
Finally, the similarity in the profit margins of 
individual routes is remarkable. In practically all 
cases the coach routes that are making the highest 
losses are the same as the rail routes that are making 
the highest losses. The notable exception is the 
Glasgow - Edinburgh route where coach services are 
suffering the largest losses while conversely this is 
the rail operators' most profitable route. 
In terms of other performance criteria, Scottish 
Citylink compares favourably with competitors and 
industry averages. Broadly speaking, the financial 
position of the company is sound with gearing and 
liquidity ratios well within the norms for the 
industry. Sales growth is unremarkable but in a 
mature saturated market with little scope for growth 
except through merger and acquisitions (which is 
difficult given the industry structure) such figures are 
not too untoward. 
An examination of the company's efficiency would 
be the work of another study but on a superficial 
level efficiency would seem to be improving. 
Turnover to vehicle and staff ratios improved 
between 1995 and 1997. When comparing 
performance across the industry Citylink's costs per 
bus kilometre (71 pence) and passengers per bus 
kilometre (41.6) compare very well with industry 
averages (cf. Cowie and Asenova, 1998). These 
figures could be as much a consequence of the 
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method of operation Citylink uses, with long 
distance services operating at higher road speeds at a 
comparatively lower frequency to staged, urban 
services. However, there is almost certainly some 
element of efficiency improvement involved in the 
figures. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the past year National Express Group, the parent 
company of Scottish Citylink, acquired the franchise 
for the Scotrail passenger rail operation. This was 
seen as a conflict of interest and a threat to 
competition. The franchise arrangements were 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. Based on their own investigation and 
on views expressed (some of which utilised the 
analysis in this paper) the MMC recommended 
divestment of the Scottish Citylink coach operations. 
The company was subsequently sold in two deals 
with other coach operators, Metrolines purchased 
Scottish Citylink and Rapsons purchased Highland 
Country Buses (a subsidiary of Citylink's). 
Given these developments the impact on the analysis 
is not particularly significant. Citylink's revenue and 
cost patterns may change over time but in the short 
run are unlikely to see major changes. The question 
of competition between coach and rail operations is 
still the central issue of the analysis of conduct in the 
industry/market (hence the recommendation for 
divestment). The sale of Citylink will probably not 
have any significant impact on the situation either. 
Metrolines should continue operating the services on 
the current caontracting basis, having no significant 
fleet of it's own. The sale to Rapsons, however, is 
interesting insofar as Scottish Citylink 'competed' 
Rapsons out of express coach services between 
Glasgow and the North of Scotland in the early 
1990's. Broadly speaking this sale will have no 
significant material effect on the industry position 
either. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Nature of Competition 
From the point of view of the express coach industry 
in Scotland, the analysis of structure, conduct and 
performance shows that there are two levels of 
competitiveness. There is entry to the market, which 
with low exogenous barriers to entry and few sunk 
costs is relatively easy. Once in, though, entrants 
face a duopoly of immense market power willing to 
utilise limit (or monopoly) pricing and using patently 
unfair competitive practices. The market is easily 
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contestable but highly uncompetitive, and new 
entrants may enter at their leisure but do so at their 
own risk. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of the 
inter-city travel market, there is clear evidence of a 
highly competitive but concentrated structure, where 
rail and coach services compete directly. Entry into 
this market is almost impossible (coach operations 
for the reasons above and rail operations because of 
the passenger rail franchising process), and even if a 
new entrant was to manage entry survival is likely to 
be impossible. 
Future levels of competition are likely to be even 
lower man they are now. In the coach industry there 
is no driving force for competition and so more 
concentration may take place. Further acquisitions 
of local operators may cause more competition (at 
least between the two incumbent operators). 
Citylink has chosen not to compete with Stagecoach 
in areas where Stagecoach has taken over the 
Citylink contractor, but were Stagecoach to acquire 
an operator in a more commercially sensitive area 
Citylink could well be forced into competitive 
action. 
In the rail industry there is regulation (ensuring 
minimum levels of service and maximum fare 
levels) but again no driving force for competition. 
Given also the likelihood of a coach operator 
acquiring the rail franchise (as has happened with a 
number of franchises south of the border) 
competition seems even more remote. 
The "Success" Of Privatisation 
The Buses White Paper and the subsequent 
Transport Act, 1985, set out to privatise the holdings 
of the Scottish Bus Group with a view to meeting 
certain objectives, typical of privatisation. Goals like 
eliminating monopoly power, widening share 
ownership, removing restrictive regulation and 
supply side options such as freedom of competition 
for capital and labour market competitiveness were 
all high on the list of reasons to privatise the 
"monolithic" state owned bus companies. 
Monopoly power has not been eliminated to 
anywhere near the level it should have been with two 
or three very large operators controlling not only 
intercity but urban services as well. This point also 
reduces the effect of widened share ownership as 
shares have become concentrated in the hands of 
management or the large companies who wholly 
own the express service operators and most of the 
urban service operators. The tendency for this 
concentration is due to the lack of regulation. This 
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state monopoly was privatised without the creation 
of a regulatory "watchdog" unlike the utilities or the 
current privatisation of British Rail. 
The Future 
What was a state owned monopoly is now a 
privately owned monopoly. The removal of 
subsidies for express services, the lack of 
competition regulation and the absence of drivers for 
change in the competitive structure of the industry 
point to more of the same. Ultimately, without the 
imposition of stronger regulation, uncompetitive 
practices in intercity travel are bound to continue 
with further concentration and consolidation and 
little hope for the future of services which are likely 
to be poor financial performers in the face of a 
consolidated market. 
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TABLE 1: PRICE PER MBLE FOR TYPICAL COACH AND RAIL SERVICES 
Edinburgh-Inverness 
Glasgow-Edinburgh 
Glasgow-Ft. William 
Glasgow-Inverness 
Glasgow-Oban 
Glasgow-Wick 
Inverness-Thurso 
Aberdeen-Inverness 
Inverness-Kyle 
Edinburgh-Aberdeen 
Correlation Coefficient 
Coach 
11.491 
13.333 
10.472 
11.143 
17.021 
8.834 
11.638 
9.174 
16.707 
15.000 
0.696 
Train 
16.578 
24.468 
21.705 
16.854 
24.020 
11.612 
10.598 
19.231 
25.275 
23.077 
TABLE 2: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE CITYLINK NETWORK 
SUMMER REVENUE-COST PATTERNS FOR CITYLINK SERVICES 
Edinburgh-Aberdeen 
Edinburgh-Ft. William 
Edinburgh-Inverness 
Ft. William-Mallaig 
Ft. William-Oban 
Glasgow-Aberdeen 
Glasgow-Campbeltown 
Glasgow-Dundee 
Glasgow-Edinburgh 
Glasgow-Inverness 
Glasgow-Kyle 
Glasgow-Oban 
Invemess-Ft. William 
Inverness-Kyle 
Inverness-Ullapool 
Inverness-Wick 
TOTALS 
ADJUSTED 
REVENUE 
1039104 
118416 
532416 
23760 
137280 
1286937 
147204 
566496 
846720 
379209 
380827 
121996 
192096 
89088 
54427 
122323 
6038301 
OPERATING 
COSTS 
158247 
37909 
211491 
33393 
72285 
247157 
124765 
76464 
451811 
190188 
149236 
102811 
115401 
39284 
99690 
146141 
2256280 
APPORTIONED 
COSTS 
225759 
33739 
279595 
10915 
49617 
444821 
112383 
89311 
547033 
347323 
133223 
69960 
102708 
40686 
30266 
107173 
2624521 
ROUTE 
PROFIT 
655098 
46768 
41330 
-20548 
15378 
594959 
-89944 
400721 
-152124 
-158302 
98368 
-50775 
-26013 
9118 
-75529 
-130991 
1157514 
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TABLE 3: COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE FIGURES FOR SELECTED COACH AND RAIL 
SERVICES 
1 
1 Edinburgh-Inverness 
Glasgow-Edinburgh 
Glasgow-Ft. William 
Glasgow-Inverness 
Glasgow-Oban 
Glasgow-Wick 
Invemess-Thurso 
Inverness-Kyle 
Edinburgh-Aberdeen 
Correlation Coefficient 
Coach Costs 
92.24% 
117.97% 
74.17% 
141.75% 
141.62% 
157.68% 
207.09% 
89.77% 
36.96% 
0.5902 
Rail Costs 
29234% 
143.08% 
521.11% 
292.34% 
521.11% 
593.28% 
894.21% 
597.37% 
258.75% 
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